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INTRODUCTION
In May 2008, Buford “Keith” Simmons married Tracy
Hoogenberg.1 One year later, the parties separated, and one
month after that, Tracy filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage.2 At the time of divorce, while Keith owned a wetsuit business and maintained an ownership interest in a
commercial building, Tracy held significant investment assets
acquired from her first husband following his death.3 An
“astoundingly lengthy, circuitous, and expensive course of
litigation” followed.4 By the time the trial court resolved the
case in July 2011, Tracy had already expended more than
$800,000 in legal fees, due largely to Keith’s “questionable
legal tactics,” which included his intentional failure to comply
with the disclosure requirements.5 Specifically, Keith did not
disclose the contents of his separate property savings account,
valued at $254,850.24. In its decision, among other sanctions
applied against Keith,6 the trial court imposed the remedy for
fraudulent failure to disclose property set forth in California
Family Code Section 1101(h) and awarded Tracy the contents
of Keith’s separate property savings account, valued at
$254,850.24.7 Keith appealed, contending that California
Family Code Section 1101(h) was inapplicable to his failure to
disclose the separate property savings account.8
The Court of Appeals identified the issue as follows: does
California Family Code Section 1101(h) apply to the
nondisclosure of separate property assets?9 After a careful
consideration of the underlying law,10 the Simmons Court
looked to statutory analysis11 and other authority,12 and

1. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 587 (4th Dist. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 587–88. The Court’s analysis of these other sanctions is in an
unpublished section of the opinion.
7. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 588 (4th Dist. 2013).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 589.
10. Id. at 590–92.
11. Id. at 592–94.
12. Id. at 594.

2015]

WHEN “ANY” DOESN’T MEAN “ALL”

445

agreed with Keith.13 In short, the Court of Appeals held that
California Family Code Section 1101(h) should only apply to
nondisclosures of community property.14
I.

ABOUT THIS COMMENT

This Comment will explain how the Simmons Court
erred in its decision.15 It will start by explaining the
Simmons Court’s statement of the pertinent law16 and its
subsequent analysis of this law.17 Then, this Comment will
examine the Simmons opinion and critique its legal
analysis.18 In conclusion, this Comment will offer a simple
proposal that will eliminate the statutory interpretation issue
currently faced by California courts.19
A. The Simmons Court Presents the Law
The California Court of Appeals in Simmons (the
“Court”) began by noting that Section 721 of the California
Family Code (the “CFC”)20 imposes a broad fiduciary
relationship between spouses in their transactions with each
other.21 Namely, Section 721 “imposes a duty of the highest
good faith and fair dealing on each spouse,” requiring that
“neither [spouse take] any unfair advantage of the other.”22
The Court also noted that Section 721 “subjects the
relationship to the same rights and duties applied to
nonmarital partners under the Corporations Code.”23
However, the Court did not discuss these Corporations Code
sections in detail.24
The Court then noted the importance of CFC Section

13. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 595 (4th Dist. 2013).
14. Id.
15. See infra Part I.A.–I.K.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part I.C.–I.K.
19. See infra Conclusion.
20. California Family Code and “CFC” are used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
21. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590 (4th Dist. 2013).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also id. n.14 (citing the entirety of CAL. FAM. CODE § 721
(2014)). CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 links to CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16403, 16404, and
16503, which outline the “rights and duties” referenced in the body of the
Court’s opinion.
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1100’s specific placement in the Family Code.25 Notably, CFC
1100 is located in a section entitled “Management and
Control of Marital Property” and it delineates the rules
governing “the management and control of community
property.”26 In the same paragraph, the Court discussed that
CFC 1100 obligates each spouse “to make full disclosure to
the other spouse of all material facts and information
regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all
assets in which the community has or may have an
interest . . . .”27
CFC Section 1101 sets forth remedies for a breach of
fiduciary duty between spouses.28 Under Section 1101(a), a
spouse has a claim for any breach of the fiduciary duty that
results in the impairment of the “undivided one-half interest
in the community estate . . . .”29 Furthermore, Section 1101(f)
allows a spouse to pursue the legal remedies in this section in
either a legal dissolution action or independently, without
filing a dissolution action.30 Section 1101(g) permits a court
to award the plaintiff 50% of the value of the undisclosed
asset, whereas subsection (h) permits a court to award 100%
if the breach falls within California Civil Code Section 3294’s
“oppression, fraud, or malice” standard.31 The Court also
noted that this part of the Family Code includes sections
which “set forth rules applicable to the management and
control of community property when a spouse conveys or
encumbers the community property (Section 1102) and when
a spouse has a conservator or lacks legal capacity to manage
the community property (Section 1103).”32
In the final paragraph of the pertinent law, the Court
discussed a spouse’s general obligation to disclose assets and
liabilities in a marital dissolution.33 First, the Court noted
CFC Section 2107, which imposes sanctions upon a party’s
failure to comply with the duty of disclosure set forth in the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
2013).

Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 591 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 591–92 (4th Dist.
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chapter.34 Then, the Court pointed out CFC Section 2100,
which requires a party to a dissolution proceeding to disclose
all assets or liabilities in which one or both parties have or
may have an interest) “regardless of the characterization [of
the asset] as community or separate . . . .”35
The Court then shifted its focus to CFC Section 271,
contained in a part of the code entitled “Attorney’s Fees and
Costs.”36 Notably, this section allows a court to award
attorney fees and costs if a party’s conduct frustrates the
policies of settlement, cost reduction, and cooperative
resolution of litigation.37 The Court specifically highlighted
California Family Code Section 271(c), which reads that an
award of attorney’s fees and costs “is payable only from the
property or income of the party against whom the sanction is
imposed, except that the award may be against the
sanctioned party’s share of the community property.”38
B. The Simmons Court Analyzes the Law
The Court examined Section 1101(h) once more and listed
its goals during the process of statutory interpretation.39
First, the Court quoted the statute in full:
Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by one
spouse, as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100, when the
breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil
Code shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the
other spouse of 100[%], or an amount equal to 100[%], of
any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the
fiduciary duty.40

Then, the Court noted that its goal when interpreting a
statute was to ascertain the legislative intent of the statute so
as to effectuate its intended purposes.41 Pursuant to this end,
the Court gave the words “their ordinary and usual meaning”
and construed them “in the context of the statute as a
whole.”42
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
2011)).
42.

Id.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id. (citing In re Marriage of Fong, 193 Cal. App. 4th 278, 288 (2d Dist.
Id.
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The Court, left to resolve a case of first impression, then
discussed that it was dealing with a statutory ambiguity.43
First, the Court stated that facially, Section 1101(h) simply
refers to the nondisclosure of “any asset.”44 That is, the Court
elaborated that the statute does not specify whether its
remedy is confined to nondisclosure of a community property
asset or whether it also applies to nondisclosure of a separate
property asset.45 Finally, the Court said that neither it nor
the parties had found any case authority evaluating the issue
of whether Section 1101(h) could be applied to separate
property.46
In the very next sentence of the opinion, the Court stated
that the Legislature intended Section 1101(h) to provide a
remedy only when a spouse fails to disclose community
property.47 In support of this conclusion, it cited to the CFC
generally and with regard to four specific statutory
provisions.48 Next, it considered other authority, including
case law and secondary legal commentary.49 Lastly, the
Court considered a final counter argument before rendering
its ultimate decision.50
The first of the four statutory reasons cited by the Court
dealt with Section 1101(h)’s specific location in the CFC.51
Specifically, the Court argued that Section 1101(h) is set forth
in a section of the Family Code that “exclusively concerns”
matters associated with community property.52 For example,
Section 1101(a)—located in the same section as 1101(h)—
allows a spouse to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim if the
interest of this spouse in the community is impaired by the
other spouse.53 The Court then admitted that, on its face, the
statute’s use of “any asset” could encompass both separate
and community property.54 Nevertheless, the Court read
Section 1101(h) in conjunction with Section 1101(a), and said

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 593.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594–95.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the latter’s usage of the terms “community interest”
strongly suggested “any asset [from Section 1101(h)] means
any community asset.”55
The second reason cited by the Court shed light on how
Section 1101(h) could be used outside of a dissolution action.56
That is, Section 1101(f) says that the remedy provided in
Section 1101(h) may be pursued in an action even when the
parties have not filed for dissolution.57 To the Court, the
availability of this remedy, even during a marriage,
supported the conclusion that the remedy is not intended to
extend to separate property, which “is generally not subject to
the control of the non-owner spouse and which typically only
becomes relevant upon the filing for dissolution.”58
The Court’s third reason highlighted other existing
statutory remedies for breaches of the duty to disclose
separate property.59 Notably, the Legislature purposefully
enacted remedies “that are expressly applicable to separate
property, including Section 271 for uncooperative conduct in
dissolution proceedings, and Section 2107 for nondisclosure of
marital or separate property in dissolution proceedings.”60
The existence of these distinct statutory remedies for
nondisclosure of separate property assets, to the Court,
supported the conclusion that a remedy located in a “section
of the code devoted solely to community property was not
designed to apply to separate property.”61
The Court’s fourth and final argument based on statutory
interpretation focused on the fundamental nature of
community property.62 Citing CFC Section 2550, the Court
said that a fundamental principle of family law, including
during dissolution proceedings, is that each spouse has a onehalf interest in community property.63 This in mind, the
Court then stated that Section 1101(a) provides that the
fiduciary duty with respect to marital property is designed,
among other things, to preserve that one-half interest.64 To
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
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the Court, through the enactment of the Section 1101, the
Legislature had in effect altered the one-half interest
community property formula “in the event a spouse violates
his or [sic] duty to preserve the other spouse’s one-half right
to the property, by awarding the aggrieved spouse more than
his or her one-half interest.”65 By its very nature, the one-half
interest formula does not apply to separate property, as
separate property is not subject to co-ownership-by or
division-between the parties.66 Because of this lack of coownership and division, the Court said, it followed that the
Legislature’s alteration of the one-half interest formula was
“not meant to be applied to nondisclosure of separate
property.”67
The Court then moved to relevant case law and cited four
appellate court decisions whose interpretation of Section 1101
was consistent with their own.68 The Court did not go into
specific detail regarding these decisions, but rather listed
them as follows: In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis &
Margulis,69 In re Marriage of Fossum,70 In re Marriage of
Rossi,71 and In re Marriage of Hokanson.72 Furthermore, the
Court pointed out that commentators such as the California
Practice Guide for Family Law have referred to Section 1101
remedies in the context of nondisclosure of community
property and not in the context of the nondisclosure of
separate property.73
The Court spent the remainder of its opinion refuting an
argument regarding the spousal fiduciary duty.74 Specifically,
the Court noted that: (1) on its face, Section 1101(h)
references Family Code Section 721; and (2) while Section
1100 exclusively applies to the fiduciary duty concerning
community property, the Section 721 duty is broad enough to
encompass the disclosure of separate property assets during

65. Id. at 593–94.
66. Id. at 594.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252,
1279 (4th Dist. 2011).
70. In re Marriage of Fossum, 192 Cal. App. 4th 336, 347 (2d Dist. 2011).
71. In re Marriage of Rossi, 90 Cal. App. 4th 34, 39–41 (2d Dist. 2001).
72. In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992 (2d Dist. 1998).
73. HOGOBOOM & KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW § 8:612
(The Rutter Group 2012).
74. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013).
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dissolution proceedings.75 Nevertheless, the Court noted that
when considering the statute “as a whole,” it did not think
that the Legislature intended to include the disclosure of
separate property.76 Principally, the Court stated that “the
statutory context and nature of the Section 1101(h) remedy”
supported the conclusion that the remedy is confined to
community property, and gave several reasons for so
holding.77 First, it highlighted the fact that Section 1101(h)
exists in a portion of the Family Code dedicated only to
community property.78 Second, it referred to—though did not
name—already existing statutory remedies for a party’s
failure to disclose separate property.79 Third, the Court
stated that separate property is not subject to the one-half
interest formula that is altered by the Section 1101(h)
remedy.80 Given the above, the Court was “convinced that the
reference to the general fiduciary duty statute was not
intended to extend the application of the Section 1101(h)
remedy to reach separate property.”81
C. Countering the Court
The Court’s analysis is unpersuasive for eight reasons.
One, the concessions it made at the beginning of its analysis
largely put the issue to bed almost immediately.82 Two, the
Court’s focus on the location of the statute in the Family Code
is largely irrelevant.83 Three, the Court does not consider an
important hypothetical scenario.84 Four, the Court undercuts
its own conclusion when it discusses Section 1101(f).85 Five,
the Court mistakenly assumes that other statutory remedies
thereby preclude the existence of remedies in CFC Section
1101.86 Six, the Court ignores the reason why 1101(h) exists

75. Id. (referring to In re Marriage of Walker, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1408, 1419
(1st Dist. 2006)).
76. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th at 594.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra Part I.C.1.
83. See infra Part I.C.2.
84. See infra Part I.D.
85. See infra Part I.E.
86. See infra Part I.F.
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in the first place.87 Seven, the Court’s use of case law does
not help its argument,88 and neither does the secondary
sources to which it cites.89 Eight, the Court ignores the
applicability of a case that cites to the issue at hand.90
1. The Court’s Concessions
The Court’s legal analysis begins with several
concessions that ultimately produce a head-scratching
contradiction. As previously noted, after it recited California
Family Code Section 1101(h) verbatim,91 the Court continued
that when it is interpreting a statute, its goal is to divine the
legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the
statute92 by giving the words their “ordinary and usual”
meaning and construing them in the context of the statute as
a whole.93 One could argue that the analysis should end right
here. That is, Family Code Section 1101(h) plainly reads that
the remedy shall apply to “any asset undisclosed . . . .”94
Taken with the Court’s stated intent to give statutory
language the “ordinary and usual” meaning,95 it would appear
that “any asset” means “any asset” and that Section 1101(h)
explicitly requires the disclosure of “any asset,” regardless of
the asset’s characterization as community or separate.
Furthermore, the Court’s decision to italicize the words
“as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100” when it recites the
statute in whole has additional significance.96 Assuming the
decision to italicize implies that the Court regarded Sections
721 and 1100 as important for purposes of statutory
interpretation, it is important to determine what these
Sections say vis-à-vis Section 1101(h). As previously noted,
Section 721 “imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair
dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair
First, one could make the
advantage of the other.”97

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
2011)).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See infra Part I.G.
See infra Part I.H.
See infra Part I.I.
See infra Part I.J.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id. (citing In re Marriage of Fong, 193 Cal. App. 4th 278, 288 (2d Dist.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h) (2014).
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 592 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b).
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argument that a spouse who purposefully fails to disclose
separate property assets in a divorce proceeding (the
“offending spouse”) is taking “unfair advantage” of the other
spouse. That is, the offending spouse, by their actions,
hampers the ability of the other spouse (the “offended
spouse”) to form his or her legal strategy in divorce
proceedings because the offended spouse is not able to see the
full picture of the marriage from an asset standpoint. As a
result, the offending spouse has a built-in and unfair
advantage in the divorce proceedings. Furthermore, not only
is the offended party disadvantaged by the nondisclosure, but
the presiding court suffers as well. A court is likewise unable
to see the big picture of the marriage and may render a
judgment based on selectively divulged information that
contemplates an incomplete picture of the marriage.
In addition, even if Section 721’s fiduciary duty is
insufficiently persuasive, the Corporations Code sections that
it references98 should serve to drive home this notion of unfair
advantage. The Court briefly noted that these sections of the
Corporations Code impose “rights and duties to non-marital
partners,” but specifically, these duties include: (1) the duty of
loyalty and (2) the duty of care.99 Regarding the duty of
loyalty, California Corporations Code Section 16404(b)
specifically requires that a party “account to the partnership
for all business dealings.”100 The use of the phrase “all
business dealings” echoes Family Code Section 1101(h)’s use
of the phrase “any asset” and supports the notion that
California Family Code Section 721’s “broad fiduciary”
relationship creates a large throne before which any and all
disclosures are required to kneel. Put another way, if one
agrees that Section 16404(b) requires complete disclosure of
all business dealings (regardless of the type of business
dealing), it would logically follow that Section 1101(h)
requires complete disclosure of all assets (regardless of the
type of asset). Second, regarding care between partners,
Section 16404(b) requires that a partner “operate under the
principles of good faith and fair dealing.”101 Here, using the
plain meaning of the words “good faith and fair dealing” and

98.
99.
100.
101.

In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590 (4th Dist. 2013).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404 (2014).
Id. § 16404(b).
Id.
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“unfair advantage,” (as the Court requires itself to do), only
necessitates a small logical leap to arrive at the conclusion
that a party who purposefully hides assets in dissolution
proceedings is not operating in good faith. That is, the unfair
advantage that the offending spouse gains over the offended
spouse reflects his or her failure to operate under the
principles of good faith and fair dealing.
In the next paragraph of the opinion, the Court’s
concessions only undermine its ultimate argument that
separate property disclosures are not required. As previously
noted, the Court acknowledged that 1101(h) “facially”102 and
“simply” refers to the disclosure of any asset and is silent as
to its scope of application (to community property and
separate property or to just community property).103
Furthermore, as previously noted, the Court maintained that
it found no case law on point as a compass to guide its
decision.104 Considering these concessions with the Court’s
discussion regarding the statute’s language, its own emphasis
of the statutory language, and the rules it must follow
regarding statutory construction, it appears to be a foregone
conclusion that the Court would affirm the decision of the
trial court and hold that Keith should be forced to forfeit all
that he hid from Tracy in the divorce proceedings. After all,
given that Family Code Section 1101(h) unambiguously refers
to any asset,105 and seeing as this issue is one of first
impression to a California court,106 the answer has already
been discovered and the analysis is arguably already
completed.
2. The Court’s Legal Arguments
As noted above, after the Court made several
concessions, the Court nevertheless summarily concluded
that Section 1101(h) applies only to nondisclosures of
community property.107 Furthermore, the Court transitioned
to its legal arguments, supporting its conclusion with four
statutory justifications,108 case law and secondary
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h) (2014
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 593–94.
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authority,109 and one final argument regarding California
Family Code Section 721.110 On their faces, each of these
arguments seem plausible, and the secondary references are
on point. However, upon deeper inspection, each has flaws
that undermine the Court’s ultimate conclusion.
D. Not Exclusive & Why Not Have All the Cards on Table
The Court’s first argument overly fixates on Section
1101(h)’s general location while ignoring the reason why the
case is before the court in the first place. The Court argued
that Section 1101(h)’s “any asset” means “any community
asset” in part because Section 1101(h) is located “in a portion
of the Family Code that exclusively concerns matters
associated with community property.”111 The reason why the
parties are in court in the first place is because the statutory
language of Section 1101(h) is ambiguous to such an extent
that a judicial interpretation is necessary to determine
whether or not Section 1101(h) should include separate
property. By virtue of this ambiguity, it is questionable
whether the statute may consider separate property issues as
well as community property ones. Therefore, it is debatable
whether this portion of the Family Code exclusively concerns
community property, or whether this portion of the code may
actually address separate property issues as well—even if not
explicitly stated as such. Put another way, if this code section
did unambiguously deal exclusively with community property,
then this opinion likely would have been much shorter, if
written at all.
Additionally, the Court fails to consider certain language
in Family Code Section 1101(a). California Family Code
Section 1101(a), a sister statute to Family Code Section
1101(h), “specifies that a spouse may raise a breach of
fiduciary claim” when an impairment to the spouse’s interest
However, in its
in the community property exists.112
recitation, the Court glosses over the Family Code Section
1101(a)’s use of the following phrase: “[a] spouse has a claim
against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 593.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (2014).

456

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

duty . . . .”113 Returning to the “any asset” discussion above,
the statute’s direct use of the word “any”114 once again cuts
toward a more expansive interpretation of the statute as a
whole (including separate property) than away from such an
interpretation (excluding separate property). Of course, on
the topic of actual language, Section 1101(a) does admittedly
focus on a breach “that results in impairment to the claimant
spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the
community estate . . . .”115 Facially, the Court gets this part
right—that the breach must incur an impairment to
community property in order to give rise to the claim.116
However, what if it is unclear at the time of disclosure
the extent to which an asset is community property and
separate property? For example, take Wilma (“W”), who has a
prospering business that she developed before getting
married to Harry (“H”). Unequivocally, this business, until
the marriage is finalized, is separate property. However, add
to the consideration that W operates the business without H’s
involvement; he is there merely for emotional support with
regard to the business, but does not participate at all in the
day-to-day activities. Even without his direct involvement, if
W continues to operate the business during marriage, the
business becomes what is known as a commingled asset,117
with both separate property components (the business that W
brought into the marriage) and community property
components (the extent to which both parties contributed to
the company, if only emotionally, one-half of which represents
H’s share).118
Then H and W get divorced, and W does not include this
business asset, but rather, just her interpretation of the
community property portions (as the Court’s holding would
condone).
Should the spouses themselves make this
judgment call, or should it be up to the Court to look at the
asset in totality and make the ultimate determination
pursuant to the accounting doctrines of Van Camp v. Van

113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (2014).
118. The extent to which the efforts would consist of community property is
governed by the twin doctrines of Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17 (2d
Dist. 1921) and Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 (1909).
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Camp119 and/or Pereira v. Pereira120? If only for judicial
efficiency, a court should be given the whole asset at the
onset, which would stem directly from requiring a party in
this scenario to disclose the whole nature of the business
(both separate and community property portions). In other
words, it would be more efficient—and a better course of
action—to have the parties report anything and everything,
and to require them to put all of their cards on the table at
the onset, rather than to encourage either of them to try and
game the system.
E. Undercutting Its Own Conclusion
The Court’s second argument ignores the theme of “any”
and undercuts its own conclusion. As previously noted,
California Family Code Section 1101(f) states that “any action
may be brought under this section without filing an action for
dissolution of marriage . . . .”121 To the Court, the fact that
the remedy is available even without a divorce proceeding
illustrates that it therefore was not intended to extend to
separate property, which is “generally not subject to the
control of the nonowner spouse”122 and “typically only becomes
relevant upon the filing for dissolution.”123 Once again, the
use of the word “any,” while in this instance not directly
dealing with the disclosure of separate property, does reflect a
common theme existent throughout the statute—that of a
legislative intent to require more disclosures and not less. As
such, it again cuts away from the Court’s ultimate conclusion
that separate property disclosures are not required at divorce.
In addition, the Court undercuts its argument against
119. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17 (2d Dist. 1921). “Van Camp
accounting” grants the working spouse a market rate for their services in
connection with the operation of the business. This amount is considered that
working spouse’s separate property, whereas the rest of the business is
considered community property. For more information, see J. Thomas Oldham,
Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value During Marriage, 1990
WISC. L. REV. 585, 587 (1990).
120. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 (1909). “Pereira accounting” looks at the
working spouse’s original separate property investment into the company and
grants this investment a reasonable rate of return on the initial capital input.
This amount is considered that contributing spouse’s separate property,
whereas the rest of the business is considered community property. For more
information, see Oldham supra note 119.
121. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(f) (2014) (emphasis added).
122. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
123. Id.
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disclosures of separate property at divorce when it states that
separate property only becomes relevant upon dissolution.
The thesis of this Comment—which largely argues against
the Court’s reasoning—is that separate property, in
particular the disclosure of separate property, is crucially
important at divorce (if more so than at any other time) and
therein should be disclosed in its entirety.
F. Other Remedies Are Not the Only Remedies
The Court’s third argument rests on an unfounded
assumption. The Court stated that the Legislature has
enacted separate statutory remedies “that are expressly
applicable to separate property,”124 and cites California
Family Code Section 271 (for “uncooperative conduct in
dissolution proceedings”)125 and California Family Code
Section 2107 (for “nondisclosure of marital or separate
property in dissolution proceedings”).126 The Court then
states that the statutes’ placement in separate sections of the
Family Code “supports that a remedy located in a section of
the code devoted solely to community property was not
designed to apply to separate property.”127 By making this
argument, the Court implies that remedies do not overlap
between sections. Further, when interpreting a statute, the
Court implies the language should be construed with greater
regard for the context of where the statute is located in the
code and with less regard for what the code actually says (the
plain language of the statute and also the code sections a
statute references).
Looking at the Court’s previous
arguments, the Court’s implication aligns with their previous
treatment of the law: up to this point, the Court has both
overlooked the unambiguous language of the word “any” and
has glossed over sections of the Corporations Code referenced
by Family Code Section 721.128 Furthermore, as previously
noted, there is no indication that CFC Section 1100 et seq.
are exclusively designed to deal with community property.129
As such, assuming plain language and full consideration to
statutory references should be championed in interpreting a
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.F.
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statute, the Court here has placed misguided emphasis on the
inconclusive argument of location at the expense of actual
legal substance.
G. Why the Statute Exists
The Court’s fourth argument reflects tunnel vision in its
interpretation of how much a party might be awarded
pursuant to the CFC 1101(h) remedy.
As previously
discussed, the Court noted that each spouse has a one-half
interest in the community property (CFC Section 2550),
which the fiduciary duty from CFC Section 1101 is designed
to preserve.130 The Court then said that, by virtue of the
remedy in CFC Section 1101, the “aggrieved spouse [is
awarded] more than his or her one-half interest.”131 This is
absolutely true: the sanction will result in the offended
spouse receiving more than they would without the remedy in
place. However, the Court then proceeds to maintain this
“more” does not apply to separate property because this
separate property is not subject to co-ownership by the
parties.132 The Court is correct in that, by its very nature,
only one party owns separate property.133 However, this point
is secondary to the interpretation of the statute, not primary,
and therefore should not drive the interpretation of the
statute. CFC Section 1101(h) does not exist to return parties
to their states before marriage by assigning ownership of
assets (splitting the community in half and returning
separate property to each party); there are plenty of other
statutes on point that serve that purpose.134 Rather, the point
of CFC Section 1101(h)—and the reason why it is unique—is
to punish malfeasants who disavow the statutory
requirements of disclosure. The point of the statute is for a
court to wield a big stick against those who contravene the
fiduciary duty to their spouse, not to reward a party for
duplicity against that same spouse.
H.

Case Law Does Not Help

As noted above, the Court cited to several “appellate

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 593 (4th Dist. 2013).
Id. at 593–94.
Id.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (2014).
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g); see e.g., § 1101(h).
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court decisions [that] refer to Section 1101 remedies in the
context of nondisclosure of community property.”135 Each of
these cases indeed covers California Family Code Section
1101(h), in small or large part. However, each of these cases
also, in one way or another and either directly or indirectly,
support the ultimate conclusion that separate property
should be a required disclosure at divorce, and not that the
remedy of CFC Section 1101(h) is limited to community
property.
The first case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of
Prentis-Margulis, does not apply congruently to Simmons.136
Prentis-Margulis’s principal reference to CFC Section 1101 is
the following sentence: “[Section 1101] mandates that, for
purposes of awarding the injured spouse 50[%] of the value of
an undisclosed or wrongfully transferred asset (or 100[%], in
the event of oppression, fraud, or malice), the trial court must
value the assets at the highest of three possible dates . . . .”137
The Court then determines, pursuant to California Family
Code Section 1101(g), how to value the asset and notes that
the statutes “clearly authorize a trial court to . . . best
[provide] adequate compensation to the injured spouse.”138
While the discussion regarding valuation might have been
helpful in that case, it is inapposite to the facts of Simmons
and therefore does not help the Court justify its ultimate
conclusion that only community property need be disclosed.
That being said, there is an argument to be made that the
Court implied, by its “50[%] of the value”139 recitation, that
only community property assets should be considered.
Nevertheless, the Court does not affirmatively hold as such,
most likely because such a determination was not the
foremost issue in the case. If it was the issue that the Court
was focused upon, the Court certainly could have held that
the nondisclosure of a separate property asset would warrant
some or all of the forfeiture of that asset.
The second case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of
Fossum, does not focus on the implications of applying CFC

135.
136.
2011).
137.
138.
139.

In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013)
In re Marriage of Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1279 (4th Dist.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Section 1101(h) against an offending spouse.140 Fossum’s
principal reference to CFC Section 1101 is the following
sentence: “When . . . the trial court finds a spouse has
breached her fiduciary duty, but not . . . by conduct rising to
the level of fraud, malice, or oppression, Section 1101,
subdivision (g), governs the applicable remedies.”141 The
Court then recites the language of CFC 1101(g).142 A first
issue here is similar to that faced by virtue of the reference to
In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis143: namely, In re Marriage
of Fossum focuses on CFC Section 1101(g),144 and not CFC
1101(h)—the focal point of Simmons. Though the major
difference between CFC Section 1101(g) and CFC Section
1101(h) is the requirement of “fraud, malice, or oppression”
for CFC Section 1101(h),145 the statutes do go hand in hand.
Nevertheless, a truly malfeasant spouse—one who
fraudulently conceals their assets—should rightly face
greater consequences146 than one who does not fraudulently
conceal. As such, it makes sense that a court would not
consider separate property nondisclosures with regard to
Section 1101(g), because that statute, unlike Section 1101(h)
is less about punishing the offending spouse and more about
restitution for the offended spouse.147 That in mind, were
either this court or Prentis-Margulis faced with the
circumstances in Simmons—where the point was to punish
and not make even—they may have considered the usefulness
of requiring the offending spouse to forfeit their separate
property to send a message to future would-be malfeasants.
The third case that the Court cites to, In re Marriage of
Rossi, does not touch heavily upon CFC Section 1101(h).148
Rossi’s principal reference to CFC 1101 is simply a recitation
of CFC 1101(h).149 In large part, Rossi focused upon whether

140. In re Marriage of Fossum, 192 Cal. App. 4th 336, 348 (2d Dist. 2011).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In re Marriage of Margulis, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1279 (4th Dist.
2011).
144. Id.
145. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h).
146. Consider these consequences in light of the words “but not limited to” in
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h), particularly as they apply to a judge’s discretion in
meting out punishment upon an offending spouse.
147. See supra Part I.G.
148. In re Marriage of Rossi, 90 Cal. App. 4th 34, 39–41 (2d Dist. 2001).
149. Id.

462

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

or not the actions of the offending spouse—who hid lottery
winnings from her husband at divorce—rose to the level of
fraud as required by the statute.150 Furthermore, the case
only glossed over the statute, and did not delve deeply into
the issue considered by the Court in Simmons.151 As such, for
purposes of demonstrating support for the Court’s ultimate
conclusion, Rossi is unhelpful.
The fourth and final case that the Court cites to, In re
Marraige of Hokanson, similarly only briefly discusses CFC
Section 1101(h).152 Hokanson’s principal reference to CFC
Section 1101 largely echoes the language used in Fossum in
that the court discusses the element of “fraud, malice, or
oppression” and then moves to a recitation of Section
1101(g).153 In large part, Hokanson focused upon whether or
not an offended spouse could be awarded attorney’s fees
pursuant to CFC Section 1101(g).154 When the court looked at
the plain meaning of the statute, which includes the words
“plus attorney’s fees and court costs,”155 it considered the case
fairly open and shut and rendered a judgment in favor of the
offended spouse.156 In a similar vein as Rossi, the court in
Hokanson did not cover much in the line of Section 1101(h),157
and therefore like Rossi, is unhelpful to the Court in
Simmons in justifying its ultimate conclusion.
I. Secondary Authority Does Not Help
The Court’s secondary authority is unhelpful in that the
Court fails to show how it assists the Court in making its
ultimate conclusion. As noted above, the Court states that
“commentators refer to the Section 1101 remedies in the
context of nondisclosure of community property.”158 The Court
then specifically quotes the California Practice Guide: Family
Law by Hogoboom & King, including the following in
brackets: “ [ C]onduct falling below the prescribed fiduciary
150.
151.
152.
1998).
153.
154.
155.
156.
1998).
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
See In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992–93 (2d Dist.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 992–93.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g) (2004).
In re Marriage of Hokanson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 987, 992–93 (2d Dist.
Id. at 993.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013).
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standards in the management and control of community
property subjects the wrongdoing spouse to a statutory
breach of fiduciary ‘claim’ for which the aggrieved spouse is
given explicit statutory remedies [Fam. C. § 1101].”159 Many
of the arguments relating to the fiduciary standards as well
as the fiduciary “claim” have already been touched upon.160
However, one significant part of this quote is the “explicit
statutory remedies.”161 As previously discussed, the statutes
are facially unambiguous, and explicitly refer to “any asset” in
consideration of scope within which the statute should apply.
Because the Court did not emphasize any part of the
quotation, it is unclear as to which part of this quotation the
Court wanted its audience to focus upon. However, if this
“explicit statutory remedies” segment was an important
phrase to the Court, then once again, a source that the Court
relies upon, and in this case even cites word for word, cuts
against the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the
nondisclosure of separate property is immaterial for purposes
of interpreting CFC Section 1101(h).
J. A Case that Kills
The Court’s final argument simply ignores the usefulness
and moreover the pertinence of a case to which it cited. As
previously noted, the Court’s final argument countered the
idea that CFC Section 721 would theoretically be “broad
enough to encompass the duty to disclose separate property
assets during dissolution proceedings.”162 In making this
acknowledgement, the Court cited to In re Marriage of
Walker.163 Though the Court acknowledged that CFC Section
721 might push towards that conclusion, it countered by
reciting its own argument and thus was “convinced that the
reference to the general fiduciary statute was not intended to
extend the application of the Section 1101(h) remedy to reach
separate property.”164 Because the Court took the time to cite
to Walker, it is worthwhile to examine exactly what Walker
says on the page to which the Court cites. Verbatim, the
159. Id.
160. See supra Part I.D.
161. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013)
(quoting HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 72).
162. In re Marriage of Simmons, 215 Cal. App. 4th 584, 594 (4th Dist. 2013).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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court in Walker holds as follows: “We can fathom no reason to
distinguish between a spouse’s duty to deal fairly and in good
faith with separate property and her duty to deal fairly and in
good faith with community property.”165 This statement
encapsulates a huge flaw in the Court’s line of reasoning. By
trying to bifurcate the duty of good faith, the Court had made
things needlessly complicated at its own expense. Rather
than trying to fashion two separate duties of good faith, the
Court should have simply stated that good faith requires full
disclosure, regardless of the type of asset. That way, no party
is confused about what they have to disclose, because they
have to disclose everything.
K. Notes Regarding Other Authority and Legislative
History
It is important to note, as the Court acknowledged in its
opinion, there are no cases, law review articles, or other
authorities that discuss Section 1101(h) in the manner in
which the Court in Simmons analyzes the statute.166
Excepting those cases already cited which only tangentially
reference the statute or delve into the statute in a different
context, Simmons represented the first time a court (and
authority in general) has decided whether CFC Section
1101(h)’s express provisions apply to a spouse’s nondisclosure
of separate property assets.
Furthermore, a search of the pertinent legislative history
reveals that the only modification to CFC Section 1101(h)
came in 2002.167 In that year, the California Legislature
added the words “as set forth in Section 721 and 1100” to the
statute.168 If there is an idea to be divined from this change,
it must be that the Legislature saw the importance of both of
these statutes in interpreting the language of CFC Section
1101(h). And specifically in regards to CFC Section 721, this
change indicates that the Legislature wanted the fiduciary
duty to be broadened, and not diminished.
II.

PROPOSAL

California Family Code Section 1101(h) needs to be
165.
166.
167.
168.

In re Marriage of Walker, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1408, 1419 (1st Dist. 2006).
See supra Part I.C.2.
2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4346–48 (WEST) (A.B. 583).
Id.
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clarified via a legislative revision of the statutory language.
For the myriad reasons listed above, courts across California
should not be forced to deal with this ambiguity should this
issue arise once more. Thankfully, however, though the
arguments may be complex, the fix that the legislature can
make is fairly simple.
After the words “any asset” in California Family Code
Section 1101, the legislature should include the phrase
“whether separate property, community property, or an asset
displaying characteristics of both separate and community
property.” By doing this, any and all possible ambiguity is
negated and everyone is placed on clear notice that the
statute is going to apply to both community property and
separate property. In other words, any party who fails to
disclose separate property assets at divorce will absolutely
know that they are running the risk of completely forfeiting
the asset. An example of a reformed statute would look like
the following:
1101(h). Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by
one spouse, as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100, when
the breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the
Civil Code shall include, but not be limited to, an award
to the other spouse of 100% , or an amount equal to 100%,
of any asset, whether separate property, community
property, or an asset displaying characteristics of both
separate and community property, undisclosed or
transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty.

CONCLUSION
If a change is to be made to CFC Section 1101(h), a
similar change should also be made CFC Section 1101(g).
This Comment notes the fact that those who violate 1101(h)
deserve special treatment for their fraudulent behavior, but
there are probably (if not certainly) arguments to be made
that a similar change is unwarranted with regard to the
sister statute Section 1101(g). Regardless of whether change
is necessary for CFC Section 1101(g), change is absolutely
warranted for CFC Section 1101(h), and the legislature must
take this issue out of the hands of the courts and make the
change itself. This might be wishful thinking given the
gridlock in Sacramento, but even small, seldom occurring
issues such as the topic of this Comment should deserve
recognition when the lawmakers convene to update the
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statutory language that governs our state. Hopefully, a
change is made in the near future to deter malfeasants from
bad behavior by requiring spouses in a divorce proceeding to
divulge the existence and nature of all of their assets.

